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Military, ‘Managers’ and Hegemonies of Management Accounting Controls: A 
Critical Realist Interpretation 
1. Introduction 
Given the significance of accounting in the overall control apparatus of organisations, 
management accounting control (MAC) change is, and perhaps will always be, an 
important topic for accounting researchers (Bryer, 2006).1 Empirically, this paper aims to 
provide an account of why and how a ‘new regime’ of MAC emerged in a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) in the context of changing politico-economic dynamics in Pakistan. In 
particular, we examine the role of two dominant social groups and their interrelationships 
in shaping and transforming MAC.2 We have appropriated Joseph’s (2002) work on 
hegemony as a theoretical basis for this research. 
Management accounting researchers have identified the economic interests of dominant 
social groups, namely the capitalist class and managers, as the major driving force for 
MAC changes (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Armstrong, 2002; Arnold, 1998). In the 
public sector, it is argued that economic interests or compulsions of the state lead to 
MAC changes (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et al., 2001). While the 
economic interests of powerful social groups or the state play an important role in 
bringing about MAC changes, these changes must be implemented, and perhaps 
accepted, by other (weaker) social groups, e.g. labour (Teulings, 1986); hence, the role of 
‘politics’ becomes important (Oakes and Covaleski, 1994;	  Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 
2005). Politics may involve a combination of different strategies by the dominant groups, 
including, for example, coercion (Uddin and Hopper, 2001) or consent, by 
accommodating some of the demands of less powerful groups (Saravanamuthu and 
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Tinker, 2003) as well as ideological narratives to create a ‘buy in’ to the intended changes 
(Yuthas and Tinker, 1994; Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998; Oakes and Covaleski, 1994). 
Previous studies have argued that the nature of the relationship between dominant and 
dominated groups and their respective strategies is crucial in shaping MAC changes 
(Armstrong, 1989; Bourguignon et al., 2004; Ezzamel et al., 2004).3 The relationship 
between dominant social groups within and beyond the organisational setting is also 
critical in determining the nature and mode of MAC changes (Armstrong, 1987; Ezzamel 
and Burns, 2005). It is crucial to acknowledge that dominant social groups operate not 
only at the level of organisations (Ezzamel and Burns, 2005) and professions (Armstrong, 
1987), but also within the state. More importantly, relationships between the dominant 
groups (managers, politicians, military, etc.) within the state may have a very strong 
bearing on the nature of relationships between the dominant and dominated groups 
(managers versus labour) and are important for understanding the nature and mode of 
implementing MAC changes, especially within public sector organisations. We believe 
that this relationship between dominant groups within the state is not adequately 
understood in the extant management accounting literature. This paper fills this gap by 
exploring the relationship between two dominant social groups within the state and its 
implications for MAC changes in a state-owned entity. 
Economy and politics in Pakistan have been subject to volatile changes since the country 
gained independence in 1947. The military has always been a dominant group in 
Pakistan. The last military coup took place in 1999, when General Musharraf ousted the 
civilian government on charges of corruption and bad governance leading to poor 
economic conditions. However, this changed after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, 
3 
which made Pakistan a front-line ally of the West in the war on terror. International 
financial assistance and loans began to flow into Pakistan, but with certain implicit and 
explicit conditions regarding reforming the economy and, in particular, SOEs (Dee, 
2012). This led to the rise of a second dominant socio-economic group, economic 
technocrats (private sector managers) in the state, especially the SOEs.4 The empirical 
site for this research was the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the organisation 
responsible for managing the aviation affairs of the country, set up by the Pakistan Air 
Force (PAF) in 1982. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and PAF became the central actors 
in the strategic and day-to-day activities of the organisation. In 2006, as a result of 
reforms initiated by the Prime Minister, the CAA underwent a series of management 
accounting and control changes linked to the rise of the second dominant group. Thus, 
this case presents us with a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of the relationship 
between two dominant social groups, namely the military and managers, and its 
implications for MAC changes. Utilising Joseph’s (2002) work on hegemony, this paper 
aims to explain the changes in MAC practices in an SOE by linking them with structural 
reasons for shifts in the hegemonic arrangement emerging at the national level, the 
cascading down of this arrangement to the case organisation, and the political strategies 
of the players in the ‘power bloc’ within the case organisation.5 This will be detailed and 
justified in later sections of the paper. 
The paper begins with a brief analysis of the existing literature on hegemony and MAC 
change to identify gaps that the current research aims to fill. Section 3 describes the basic 
tenets of critical realism and the concept of hegemony seen through the lens of critical 
realism, and provides justifications for its use in the current research. Research methods 
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are presented in Section 4. The empirical findings are then presented, followed by the 
discussion section. The concluding section summarises the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the research. 
2. Hegemony and Management Accounting and Control Change 
The notion of control and domination has been often linked with the economic interests 
of powerful social groups in the traditional Marxist school of thought (Neimark, 1994; 
Bryer, 2000). Accounting researchers in this tradition tried to explain MAC changes by 
linking them with the efforts of capitalists to control the labour process in, for example, 
the US steel and textile industry (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991) and the British cotton 
industry (Toms, 2005) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and British 
manufacturing industries during the British industrial revolution (Bryer, 2005). 
The Marxist notion of economic relations between labour and the capitalist class as the 
sole foundation of social relations was later challenged and refined by neo-Marxist 
scholars (e.g. Gramsci, 1971; Althusser, 1970; Poulantzas, 1967; and Burawoy, 1983) 
using the notion of hegemony. While maintaining that the domination of certain social 
groups, for example capitalists, remains an important condition for the reproduction of 
capitalist modes of production, these scholars discounted the significance of the market 
whip as the main element of this control (Burawoy, 1983). Instead, they emphasised the 
role of politics and ideology in maintaining this domination, a phenomenon generally 
known as hegemony. 
Researchers have also highlighted the central role of the state in maintaining the 
domination of certain social groups over others primarily by generating consent amongst 
the dominated groups rather than through coercion (Althusser, 1970; Burawoy, 1983). It 
5 
is argued that material concessions, such as social welfare and minimum wages, as well 
as ideological narratives disseminated through the media, education and religion 
contribute to the manufacturing of consent (Gramsci, 1971; Burawoy, 1985; Althusser, 
1970). It is also argued that, for a state to perform this function of hegemony, it must 
forge an alliance between different social groups with various interests to create a power 
bloc (Poulantzas, 1967; Gramsci, 1971). Aided by the state, the groups in the power bloc 
reinforce their ideologies, or provide material concessions if necessary, to place them in a 
position to dominate the entire sphere of social and political lives (Gramsci, 1971). 
Dominated groups, on the other hand, may organise open or subtle resistance to dislodge 
the power bloc (Gramsci, 1971). We would argue that the study of management control 
and hegemony must thus involve an exploration of this tripartite relationship between the 
state, the dominant groups (the power bloc) and the dominated groups. 
This tripartite relationship has been subject to some radical shifts in the recent past, in 
both private and public sectors. In the private sector, mobility of capital has increased the 
power of dominant groups (especially capitalists) over dominated groups and over the 
state (Burawoy, 1983). In the public sector, which is of greater interest to us in this 
research, the advent of a new public management (NPM) regime has caused a major shift 
in the nature of the tripartite relationship. Accounting researchers have explored changes 
to the tripartite relationship and MAC on two levels: the injection of NPM ideas into 
public sector controls and the privatisation of public sector firms. 
Accounting researchers exploring management control changes in the context of 
privatisation have appropriated the notion of hegemony (Uddin and Hopper, 2001; 
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008).6 Employing Burawoy’s (1979, 1985) idea of 
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factory regimes (hegemonic arrangements), Uddin and Hopper (2001) demonstrated how 
a privatisation programme by the state resulted in the creation of a different ‘production 
regime’ that had an influence on shop-floor controls. Controls became more coercive, 
with redundancies, the casualisation of workers, and top-down budgeting with strict 
physical targets. Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008), applying the notion of 
hegemony and the concept of practice advanced by Connell (1987), found the labour on a 
privatised Sri Lankan tea plantation firm to be controlled by a complex myriad of market 
realities, age-old ritualised practices, and beliefs of labour about their own welfare. The 
dominant groups –local politicians and owners of these plantations – engendered and 
perpetuated these beliefs and practices to serve their own economic and political 
interests. Similarly to the studies cited above, a number of other accounting studies have 
explored the strategies of capitalists and senior management to control labour and first-
line managers in fully or partially privatised firms (Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). 
Accounting researchers have also explored how economic pressures combined with a 
new NPM ideology drive the state to effect major changes in MAC practices within 
public sector organisations (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993; Cooper and Neu, 1995; 
Edwards et al., 1999; Ezzamel et al., 2004; Ashraf and Uddin, 2013). Goddard (2005) has 
linked the emergence of new accounting practices in local governments in the UK to a 
new post-Fordist hegemonic arrangement between the state, the economy and civil 
society. Similarly, accounting researchers have studied cases in which new public 
management-inspired accounting and control changes have been introduced by the state 
in, for example, the fields of health and education, areas that had not previously been 
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exposed to the logic of economic efficiency (Lawrence and Sharma, 2002; Broadbent et 
al., 1996). In some cases, changes have been seen as a contested process, with resistance 
to proposed changes inspired mainly by private sector ideals, whereas in other cases 
changes have been implemented through consent (Dent, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1998; Broadbent et al., 2001). 
The body of accounting literature that explores MAC changes in the context of this 
tripartite relationship between the state, the dominant groups and the dominated social 
groups is extremely insightful. However, we believe that important facets of this 
phenomenon remain under-explored. First of all, in most of these cases, especially where 
interaction between the state and dominant social groups within a field is explored, the 
state is theorised as a monolithic entity with a single logic of action (March and Olsen, 
1984). However, as the organisational and political science literature demonstrates, the 
state comprises multiple institutions, many of which are contradictory in nature (March 
and Olsen, 2009). These multiple contradictory institutions prescribe various logics of 
action, thus creating space for different social groups to advance their interests (March 
and Olsen, 2009). For instance, social groups such as general practitioners and teachers 
have been found to resist controls introduced by the state on the logic of ‘economic 
efficiency’, using the notions of ‘care’ or ‘quality of education’ (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2001). Within the state, it is generally dominant social groups that are able to manoeuvre 
institutions or exploit institutional contradictions in their efforts to assert their hegemony 
(Jessop, 1994). MAC changes introduced by the state (or within state-controlled 
organisations) thus need to be seen in the context of power struggles between different 
social groups aiming to assert their control within the state. 
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Secondly, while much emphasis has been placed on the relationship between dominant 
and dominated social groups (capital/managers versus labour), the relationship between 
dominant social groups within the state has not been explored in detail. For example, 
what factors lead to the emergence of dominant social groups and the creation of a new 
power bloc? What are the strategies, actions and conflicts of these dominant social groups 
in forming the power bloc? Perhaps more importantly, what are the implications of these 
relationships/interactions between the dominant social groups in shaping the content of 
MAC changes and their consequences for the dominated groups? The answer to all these 
questions may help us obtain new theoretical insights about MAC changes in 
organisations operating in the public sector. 
Thirdly, some MAC changes are bitterly contested while others are accepted without 
resistance (Dent, 1991; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2001). A traditional critical analysis 
may invoke the notion of hegemony to deal with this issue by suggesting that it depends 
whether the dominated social groups are hegemonised by the ideological narrative that 
accompanies the MAC changes made by the dominant social groups. But what creates the 
ideological appeal of the message that comes from the dominant social groups? This 
question inevitably leads us, first of all, to consider the conditions of the emergence of 
the power bloc, the relationship between the dominant social groups within the bloc, and 
their actions and strategies vis-à-vis each other. 
Thus, we have sought to appropriate a theory of hegemony – in particular, the critical 
realist theory of hegemony – that encapsulates the conditions that lead to the rise of a 
power bloc, as well as the actions and strategies of members of the bloc. Section 3 
provides further details of this. 
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3. Critical Realist Theory of Hegemony 
Joseph’s (2002) work is based on a fundamental critique of existing research on 
hegemony. Joseph argues that researchers tend to either over- or under-emphasise the 
structural and agential roots of hegemony, and hence he calls for analytical dualism, a 
methodological framework that is the hallmark of critical realist philosophy, to gain a 
better insight into hegemonic arrangements and struggles. 
Critical realism is a social science philosophy, pioneered by Roy Bhaskar (1979, 1997), 
which attempts to explain social phenomena through the concepts of emergence, depth 
ontology, and dualism. When individuals form collectivities, such as an economic mode 
of production or a bureaucratic organisation, these collectivities have emergent powers 
and properties that are different from those of the individuals. Once formed, these 
collectivities, referred to by critical realists as structures, provide the holders of positions 
within a structure (capitalist, chief executive officer) with powers and interests that 
‘push’ them to act in a certain manner (structural tendencies). However, they also have 
agential powers and properties, including the power to reflect. These ‘agents’ weigh up 
structural pressures arising from the ‘positions’ that they occupy to decide on an 
appropriate course of action. 
According to critical realism, since agents inhabit multiple structures simultaneously, 
their actions cannot be predetermined. The interaction of different structures (political, 
economic, social, etc.) and their mediation through human agency cause empirical events. 
In order to explain an empirically manifested social phenomenon, it is important for 
researchers to identify first the structures (and their associated tendencies) and then the 
human agency, a concept known in critical realism as analytical dualism (Archer, 1995; 
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for an example of critical realist research employing analytical dualism in management 
accounting change, see Stergiou et al., 2013). Drawing on analytical dualism, Joseph 
(2002) suggests that any explanation of hegemony should involve an explanation of both 
the structural reasons for its emergence and the experiences and actions of various agents. 
Joseph (2002) argues that existing structural conditions create incentives for dominant 
groups to win the consent (or control) of others, either to maintain existing structures or 
to bring about minimal change to ensure that they maintain their dominance. Hegemony, 
therefore, plays a role in ensuring structural reproduction and social cohesion (Joseph, 
2002, p.38). A central concept in Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony is the formation 
of a ‘power bloc’. The structural tradition of hegemony, especially in earlier studies, finds 
that the state plays a central role in mobilising hegemony by developing ‘power blocs’ 
(alliances between factions and classes with various interests) and generating consent 
within society (Althusser, 1970; Gramsci, 1971; Poulantzas, 1967; Burawoy, 1983). Most 
accounting research inspired by the concept of hegemony has a ‘structural’ slant to it 
whereby MAC changes are linked to the need to control labour, thus reproducing the 
economic structures, involving the role of the state (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 
2012, p.469). 
However, the state is also the terrain in which the hegemonic projects of various groups 
unfold as they vie to promote their vested interests by generating consent or coercion 
(Joseph, 2002). This is the agential aspect of hegemony, which involves the strategies of 
agents, including using alliances, concessions, compromises and, where necessary, 
coercion. This view of hegemony attaches importance to the relationships between 
different groups and their experiences as influenced by a hegemonic system of meanings 
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and practices (Williams, 1982). In this school of thought, class and hegemony are not 
static but are shared and lived experiences. In Thompson’s (1978) narrative, hegemony is 
an active agential project designed by dominant groups through a complex process of 
negotiation and bargaining. Agential theories of hegemony have inspired organisational 
researchers to explore hegemonic struggles between dominant and dominated classes 
within organisations, or within organisational fields, and their implications for 
organisational control (Humphreys and Brown, 2002; Sallaz, 2004; Brown and Coupland, 
2005; Brown and Humphreys, 2006; Degiuli and Christopher, 2007). This hegemonic 
struggle between groups means that strategies followed by the state may not always be in 
the best interests of the reproduction of economic structures. However, given their 
importance, state strategies cannot be devised with a total disregard for the demands of 
economic structures, i.e. the structural aspect of hegemony. 
Combining the structural and agential aspects of hegemony, Joseph’s theory of hegemony 
(2002) is an attempt to present Gramsci’s work in a critical realist light. Joseph (2002) 
asserts that, in order to extend Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in a realist direction, it is 
important that the formation of the ‘power bloc’ is linked with the necessity for the 
reproduction or transformation of existing social structures through an elaborate political 
strategy (Joseph, 2002, p.28). This theory is especially helpful for organisational 
researchers because it provides a framework of analytical dualism that helps 
operationalise the concept of hegemony. 
In Sections 5 and 6, this framework will be operationalised by analysing the structural 
conditions that led to the emergence of the military as a dominant group in Pakistan and 
within the case organisation. The paper will examine MAC practices within the case 
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organisation and their links with the ideology and interests of the military, the dominant 
group. It will then analyse the changed structural conditions that caused another social 
group (the managers) to become powerful in the national politics and in the case 
organisation, leading to hegemonic struggles between the two social groups as each 
group tried to assert the MACs espoused by its own ideology. The agential part of our 
theoretical framework helps us to understand the hegemonic projects of the two dominant 
groups and their effect on the MAC practices in our case organisation. The hegemonic 
struggle eventually resulted in a truce between the two powerful social groups, thus 
forming a power bloc. The hegemonic struggle and the conflicted compromise had 
implications for the nature of the MAC changes that were eventually agreed between the 
two powerful social groups, and for the manner in which these changes were 
implemented within the case organisation. 
4. Research Methods 
Conducting an intensive case study in traditional settings is fraught with difficulties 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Accessibility to the research site and the extraction of rich 
data from it is a challenge (Devereux and Hoddinott, 2002). Fortunately, in this case, one 
member of the change team was a former student of the first author. This connection 
opened doors to us. The data were collected over a span of six months in 2008. Apart 
from collecting documentary evidence, we conducted interviews with relevant 
personnel.7 
We began interviews at CAA headquarters with top management, represented by the 
directors of various functions, followed by interviews with their immediate juniors and 
members of the change team. Selection criteria for the interviews were based on the 
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principle of theoretical sampling (Mason, 2002). Our research approach demanded that 
we capture the views and actions of members of various groups within and outside the 
CAA vis-à-vis different MAC practices. We also needed to trace the origin of those 
management control practices that were subject to change efforts by the current 
managerial regime. This necessitated interviewing retired officers, some of whom were 
among the founders of the CAA. Since the CAA was only twenty-five years old at the 
time of the data collection, we were able to interview some key agents, including two 
former Director Generals (DGS, chief executives) of the CAA. We also interviewed 
former officials who had been involved in setting up the finance function in the early 
years of the CAA. These interviews provided key insights into the military ideology and 
how it shaped the management control practices of the CAA, as well as considerable 
information on early MAC practices. 
As far as analysis of the data is concerned, we followed the critical realist tradition. This 
approach requires social changes (in this case, changes in MAC) to be explained by 
identifying structural conditions as well as the agency of different actors. Our first task 
was thus to identify the structural conditions that led to the emergence of the military as a 
dominant social group within the state as well as within the case organisation. An 
important data source that helped us to identify the structural conditions leading to the 
emergence of the military as a hegemonic force at the national level was a review of the 
political and social literature (Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 1998, 2003; Ahmad, 2004). In order to 
identify the changed structural conditions at the time of the military take-over in 1999, 
we conducted a review of scholarly works by political economists (e.g. Kukreja and 
Singh, 2005), as well as a review of articles published in national and international 
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newspapers.8 These news reports proved very useful for developing a general 
understanding of the changed structural conditions that paved the way for the second 
dominant social group (the managers) to emerge on the national scene as well as within 
the case organisation. 
Analysis of the interviews was of crucial importance in identifying the structural 
conditions that led to the dominance of the military and, later on, the rise of the managers 
as a second dominant group within the case organisation. The focus of our data collection 
was on management control practices, specifically their evolution and efforts to change 
them. Identification of the structural hegemonic conditions required us to trace 
management control practices back to structural conditions. A key series of questions that 
helped us to identify the structures at work included: “What does the existence of this 
object (in this form) presuppose? Can it exist on its own as such? If not, what else must 
be present? What is it about the object that makes it do such and such?” (Sayer, 1992, 
p.91). These questions normally take the form of tracing actions back to rules and thence 
to structures (Sayer, 1992, p.112). For example, there was a practice that the MoD 
authorised the allocation of routes to different airlines, including the national airline, 
which was not in line with accepted aviation practices around the world, where aviation 
regulators make such decisions independently. We traced this practice back to aviation 
rules. However, the most important question from a critical realist perspective is: “Why 
these rules?” (Sayer, 1992). This, in turn, led to the identification of structures that would 
‘cause’ the MoD to enact and implement such rules and incentivise one entity (the MoD) 
to exercise dominance over another. 
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A review of the archival data, historical commentaries and interviews with individuals 
(with a focus on tracing back from empirical MAC practices to structural hegemonic 
conditions) helped us identify that there were two clear eras of MAC practices in the 
history of the CAA. The first era – identified as the military hegemony – ran from the 
inception of the organisation until 2006. The second era started when a new DG took 
charge of the organisation in 2006, a time when the ‘managers’ also became a dominant 
group within the state. Analysis of interviews and documents revealed a desired ‘break’ 
from the past and the identification of new ‘ideal’ MAC practices. This was the domain 
of agency, and our analysis in this phase sought to understand the hegemonic struggles 
between the two dominant groups in their efforts to dominate the social landscape. 
The first-cut analysis of interviews, newspaper items and official correspondence 
between the MoD and the CAA clearly reflected a struggle for control between the two 
groups during the second era. At this level of analysis, we analysed the data (interviews, 
intra-organisational memos, inter-office correspondence between the MoD and CAA, 
news items), paying closer attention to the ideologies, intentions, interpretations and 
actions of various agents, including the two dominant groups as well as dominated groups 
such as labour and lower pay-group officers. A coding scheme was used to identify the 
actions, reactions and ideologies of the two dominant groups as they tried to change or 
resist changes to specific MAC practices. This was an iterative process with continuous 
shifts back and forth between the data, the theoretical scheme (realist notion of 
hegemony) and the codes. For example, our data revealed that the managers suggested 
that power to make decisions relating to aviation rights should be vested in the 
‘managers’ running the organisation. They contended that this was how it was done in 
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‘modern’ aviation organisations internationally. In the initial coding scheme, we coded 
the action as ‘modernising the organisation’. However, further analysis of the data, as 
well as our theoretical orientation, resulted in this action being eventually classified as a 
‘frontal attack’ by the managers on the military. This analysis helped us to develop a 
theoretical scheme that captured the dynamics of the hegemonic struggle between the two 
dominant groups. The analytical scheme that we eventually developed was shared with 
peers to ensure that it satisfactorily captured the process of the hegemonic struggles and 
their outcome regarding the content of the MAC changes, their ideological consistency, 
and the manner in which these changes were implemented. 
5. Emergence of the Military and the Military Hegemony 
Joseph (2002) stresses that understanding the formation of historical power blocs is 
crucial to understanding the structural roots of hegemony. In our case, the military was 
the most dominant group in Pakistan. As Gramsci (1971) suggests, certain political, 
economic and cultural conditions must be present for a group to assert itself as dominant. 
These structural conditions and their implications for MAC in the CAA are examined in 
Section 6. 
The roots of military dominance in Pakistan can be traced back to the British legacy of 
bureaucratic and authoritative control (Jalal, 1995, p.18). During their rule in India, the 
British relied heavily on the institutions of civil and military bureaucracy. The violent 
partition of India and Pakistan was immediately followed by disputes over areas and 
states adjoining the two countries, with both states claiming rights to these areas, thus 
triggering armed conflicts between the two. Although weak in terms of resources, 
Pakistan’s military was immediately strengthened by its acquisition of military resources, 
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primarily through foreign loans, to ward off risks on both eastern and western borders 
(Talbot, 2003). With the further acquisition of resources, this already strengthened 
organisation became a strong military body. 
Two wars with India, in 1965 and 1971, seemed to fuel an already ingrained sense of 
insecurity in the minds of the Pakistani people, which further strengthened the military 
institution (Ahmad, 2004). Unlike neighbouring India, Pakistan’s weak political 
organisation tipped the balance in favour of a military bureaucracy (Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 
1998). Pakistan became a state in which ‘national interests’ became synonymous with 
‘defence interests’ or ‘national security’ (Ahmad, 2004). While there were short periods 
of civilian rule in the 1950s, 1970s and 1990s, every civilian administration eventually 
culminated in the return of martial law. Military governments enacted laws creating 
mandatory quotas for the appointment of military officials in civilian organisations, 
which resulted in the expansion of the military’s influence across the state, civil society 
and the economy, including the case organisation, the CAA. Section 5.1 illustrates how 
the dominance of the military affected management controls at the CAA following its 
inception in 1982. 
5.1 Management Accounting Control: The Military Hegemony (1982-2006) 
As an autonomous entity, the CAA had its own board of directors. While the board 
comprised seven members representing several ministries, the MoD remained in control 
of appointing key officials and taking strategic decisions.9 The MoD was granted two 
permanent positions on the board, including the position of Chairman of the Board of 
Directors. These provisions were included in the CAA Ordinance, with a clear intent to 
ensure that the CAA would remain under the control of the MoD so as to protect the 
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‘national interest’. For example, officials of the MoD pointed out that setting up an 
airport in the country was not simply a commercial but also a ‘strategic’ decision made 
on the basis of ‘security interests’ to protect the ‘national interest’. 
The CAA regulated Pakistan’s airspace for civilian purposes and was thus interested in 
allowing more national and international airlines to fly to and from Pakistani airports. 
However, this was not in the interests of the Pakistan International Airline (PIA), a state-
owned ‘national flag carrier’ controlled by the MoD. In order to protect PIA, the Ministry 
would not allow the CAA independently to exercise the right to license airlines to fly. 
This MoD control over the affairs of the CAA also extended to routine operational 
matters, such as appointments and transfers. 
Unsurprisingly, the ideas and principles of military institutions, such as the PAF, had a 
major impact on organisational structure, recruitment and promotion in the CAA, 
reflected in its matrix structure. They also influenced accounting, cost management 
practices and the performance evaluation system. Table 1 summarises the ideology of the 
military and its implications for management controls at the CAA. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Safe aviation was the central philosophy and main driver of operational controls that 
formed the bulk of management controls of the CAA during the military hegemony. As 
will be explained below, MAC was designed to achieve operational effectiveness, with 
economic efficiency as a secondary concern. This was reflected in the vision statement of 
CAA: “promote a safe, efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated civil air 
transport service and control and regulation of civil aviation activities” (CAA Ordinance 
1982, Section 5(2)). 
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The organisational structure of the CAA was developed along the same lines as the PAF, 
being divided into four major functional areas called directorates: operations, 
maintenance, administration and electronics. Unsurprisingly, following the PAF tradition, 
the operations directorate, also called air traffic control (ATC), was considered the main 
directorate, with the other directorates playing supporting roles. ATC had the most 
privileged status and was allotted the most senior positions. This policy of appointing air 
traffic control personnel was also in line with the PAF ideology of ‘safety first’. 
Comments made by a former DG of the CAA reflect the same sentiment: 
In every organization there is a VIP crowd. In the air force, the VIP crowd is 
fighter pilots, and in CAA, your VIP group had to be ATC (Air Traffic Control) 
guys. One of them is going to become your DG one day … What if there is an 
emergency at the airport? Say an emergency landing – the airport manager has 
to act as a bridge between Air Traffic Control and a host of other departments. 
He can only perform his job effectively if he knows ATC operations. 
In line with PAF management philosophy, the airport manager, appointed by the ATC, 
was also granted immense power within the CAA. The airport manager was responsible 
for both operations and management, i.e. for virtually all activities taking place at the 
airport. Therefore, officers of all directorates working at airports were placed under the 
administrative control of the airport manager. 
Given the power and scope of the ATC, career progression was much easier in this 
directorate, as many officers commented. Officers in other directorates had been on the 
same pay grade for more than fifteen years, while officers in ATC had been promoted 
twice in the same time period. This created considerable resentment among the officers. 
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The domination of the ATC (combined with continuous direct appointments from the 
PAF) meant that employees of other directorates were rarely able to reach senior 
positions within the CAA. There was also a divide between ‘staff’ and ‘officers’, and 
between ‘staff’ and ‘daily wagers’. According to ‘military rules’, the lower-grade 
employees (staff) were kept on a tight leash from the outset and were not allowed to form 
an organisation for the collective pursuit of their demands. This, and the domination of 
PAF ‘ideas’ over the working of the CAA, was a constant source of dissatisfaction 
among employees at all levels. 
The ideology of the PAF was also crucial with regard to managing costs and measuring 
performance. For example, in referring to the CAA’s priorities, a close aide of the first 
DG of the CAA said: 
You see, his priorities were as follows, in the order in which they came: firstly, 
operational efficiency, i.e. airworthiness, radars, fire engines etc.; secondly, 
facilitation, i.e. security and upkeep of furniture etc.; and thirdly, revenue, i.e. 
where it is being spent... 
In order to maintain operational controls and efficiency, accounting played mainly a 
stewardship role bounded by the ordinance and the laws. Pressure to manage costs 
proactively was minimal at the CAA. Any outflow of economic resources necessitated 
extensive documentary support and multiple authorisations to ensure that money was 
spent efficiently and in accordance with the approved budget. The main focus of this 
system was to ensure that there was no embezzlement of funds. An ex-senior manager 
(military background) commented: “What we didn’t want was a ghapla 
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[fraud/embezzlement of funds]. Our reputation was at stake. The Air Force’s reputation 
was at stake. We couldn’t afford that.” 
Earning financial resources was important only so that these could eventually be spent on 
infrastructural development. A first-generation senior financial officer described their 
approach as a desire to “earn and burn”. The same approach was followed by all 
incoming DGs, almost all of whom belonged to the PAF. Economic feasibility took a 
back seat to the overwhelming presence of military institutions and their command and 
control strategies. Firstly, these institutions set certain primary objectives for the 
organisation, which were to ensure the safety of air traffic and to develop an aviation 
infrastructure for this purpose. Thus, economic criteria never appeared in managers’ 
decision-making frames. These decision-making orientations made certain kinds of 
control more important in the day-to-day running of the organisation, targeted primarily 
at the organisation’s operations. The role of accounting in this scenario was therefore of a 
different nature: accounting information had little influence in business decisions. For 
example, in order to start new projects, the only role of accounting information was to 
reveal to the CAA top managers how much money was available, and what, if any, was 
the shortfall. The economic inflows and financial viability of projects were of no real 
concern. 
Unsurprisingly, accounting also played a limited role in performance measurement. The 
performance measurement system hinged on annual confidential reports (ACRs), an age-
old symbol of military and civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. An ACR was written at the end 
of each calendar year for each employee by their immediate manager and counter-signed 
by the manager’s immediate superior. The counter-signing authority had the right to 
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overrule the original assessment. The ACR for each employee was filed in a dossier 
known as his or her ‘character roll’, and the relevant authorities could refer to this dossier 
to reach decisions on the promotion, posting or training of the employee concerned. 
In summary, we have identified the structural conditions that led to the emergence of the 
military as a powerful player in the country. These included political and ideological 
conditions stemming from the historical circumstances under which Pakistan came into 
existence and the rather hostile geopolitical conditions in which it had to operate. The 
superior organisation of the military and its resource richness enabled it to assume a 
dominant position with regard to the country’s political and economic structures. The 
ideology of national security was another important factor that maintained the hegemony 
of the military over the state of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2004). However, for a group to remain 
in a dominant position, the underlying political, economic and ideological structures must 
be reproduced (Gramsci, 1971); any breakdown in these structures may result in social 
upheaval, which may not be of benefit to the dominant groups. As explained in Section 6, 
poor economic conditions in Pakistan led to the rise of a new dominant group – 
‘managers’ – who had their own interests and supporting ideology, with implications for 
MACs within the CAA. 
6. Emergence of a New Power Bloc: The Military and the Managers 
Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests in 1998 resulted in international economic sanctions 
(mainly in the form of the withdrawal of economic aid) but gave credibility to military 
institutions in Pakistani politics. However, this posed new challenges for the state in the 
form of economic problems. Financial sanctions by the West affected the country’s 
economy to the point where it became almost bankrupt. In 1999, General Musharraf, the 
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then army chief, overthrew the elected government, citing serious economic problems 
and corruption in the country. In his first address to the nation, Musharraf promised to 
deal with the economic crisis and with corruption in state entities. To this end, a high-
ranking official of Citibank, Mr Shaukat Aziz, was appointed Finance Minister of 
Pakistan.10 This was, perhaps, the beginning of the emergence of a new ‘power bloc’, a 
bloc which emerged out of a necessity for the state to improve its economic performance. 
In addition to defence personnel, the new bloc included economic experts and private 
sector managers. 
The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US made Pakistan a front-line ally of the West in the war 
on terror, and international financial assistance and loans again began to flow in. At the 
same time, this new relationship had immense material and symbolic benefits for the 
military, as it legitimised military rule in Pakistan. Under military rule, general elections 
were held in 2002 and, as expected, a pro-military government came into power. 
Musharraf assumed the position of President in the new set-up, without relinquishing his 
position as Chief of Army Staff.11 Economic control was handed over to the Finance 
Minister, who had developed a reputation as a good economic manager over the previous 
two years.12 
In 2004, Aziz was made Prime Minister, giving impetus to his efforts toward economic 
reforms.13 Aziz immediately stressed the importance of a ‘result-oriented culture’ in the 
governance of the country (Frontier Star, 2004). In order to operationalise this ‘result-
oriented culture’, in his very first meeting with his cabinet the Prime Minister asked 
cabinet members to prepare ‘quantifiable goals and targets’ (ibid.). He believed that 
‘from the[se] goals and targets [would] emerge the vision of [his] government’ (The 
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Pakistan Newswire, 2004). The tasks and targets set for the cabinet were supposed to be 
reviewed on a quarterly basis (Frontier Star, 2004). 
Aziz was trying to run the federal government in a corporate style, something with which 
he was more familiar than the military generals and the civilian bureaucracy. However, 
political commentators in the country were clear that, in this power-sharing arrangement 
between himself and General Musharraf, the latter carried more weight. In fact, when 
Shaukat Aziz became prime minister, this arrangement was often discussed and reported 
by political analysts. 
Shaukat Aziz in many ways fulfils the same criteria on which [the previous prime 
minister] was selected: he does not have any independent political support, and 
he is a [General’s] loyalist who would not hinder General Musharraf's rule. 
Where Aziz differs from the previous prime minister is in his technical and 
intellectual skills. A former international banker, Aziz is credited with turning 
Pakistan's economy round when it was on the brink of bankruptcy (Idris, 2004). 
In order to accelerate the process of economic revival, the new government of Prime 
Minister Aziz decided to follow the same approach in all public sector corporations, i.e. 
requiring them to prepare business plans setting quantifiable profit targets and to measure 
these periodically. Furthermore, in order to give further impetus to these initiatives, the 
new government started to appoint private sector business managers as executive heads 
of state-run corporations and organisations. The CAA was one of the first public 
enterprises subject to these reforms. Section 6.1 discusses the hegemonic struggles 
between the two social groups as each group tried to assert MACs espoused by its own 
ideology. 
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6.1 Management Accounting and Control: Military and Managers (2006 Onwards) 
The CAA’s change programme began when the Prime Minister, as part of his efforts to 
‘reform’ public sector organisations, convened a meeting of CAA senior officials (most 
of whom had a military background) to assess their progress. The instructions from the 
Prime Minister’s office were that the profit potential of the organisation should be 
assessed and tapped. In an effort to reorient public sector firms towards commercial 
success, the Prime Minister decided to appoint ex-managers of large and commercially 
successful private sector firms as executive heads of public sector firms. Therefore, in 
2006, the former head of a large international oil marketing firm was appointed as DG of 
the CAA, replacing an ex-PAF DG. This was the first time that a private sector business 
manager had been appointed as executive head of this military-dominated civilian 
organisation. It was a state gesture privileging economic expertise. 
The new DG was appointed on a two-year contract with a mandate from the Prime 
Minister “to bring about change in an old style SOE that has not been able to do much in 
the past”. Appointment of a new DG ushered in an era of political manoeuvring to assert 
the hegemony of two social groups, military and managers – the terrain of the agential 
aspect of hegemony. Table 2 presents the managerial hegemony and its ‘desired’ MAC at 
the CAA. The process began with a frontal attack by managers on the military hegemony, 
seeking to assert control in the name of ‘modern day management’. 
[Insert Table 2] 
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6.1.1 ‘Frontal Attack’ by Managers 
In order to kick-start the change process, the new DG immediately formed a small change 
team. The common characteristics of the change team were that they were all relatively 
young and well-versed in the latest managerial trends (almost all of them holding 
business-related degrees, which was uncommon in the CAA), and they were all mid-level 
managers. The mandate of the team was to identify changes that needed to be brought 
about in the CAA. 
The new DG was clear about the basic change required in the CAA, which was to make 
all aviation-related decisions on an economic basis. On the issue of protecting PIA, he 
had publicly stated: 
The existing aviation policy provides a non-level playing field and protects one 
airline, which does not allow the aviation sector to grow in the country and 
international airlines to come into Pakistan … By protecting PIA, [we have] not 
done it any service but weakened it. There is a need for competition… (Khaleej 
Times, 2007). 
The general views of the change team regarding the problems facing the organisation 
included the undue influence of military institutions; overstaffing; an excessively tall and 
top-heavy organisational structure; the dominance of air traffic control; outdated 
managerial practices, such as the obsolete performance measurement system; and a lack 
of requisite business expertise. 
A number of suggestions was made by the change team. The biggest suggested change 
was independence of the CAA from the MoD in making licensing and other decisions. 
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Other suggested changes included dividing the organisation’s structure into three separate 
functions: regulatory, air traffic control, and airport management. While the first two of 
these already existed to a certain extent, the change team suggested that airport 
management should be treated as a separate ‘business’. This effectively meant that the 
aviation side of the airport would be managed by air traffic control personnel, while the 
passenger side would be handled by personnel with expertise in passenger facilitation, 
security and commercial aspects. At the Senate Standing Committee on Defence, the DG 
of the CAA commented: 
Air traffic controllers used to become … airport managers. Now we are saying 
these are two separate roles … we did not have trained people to handle 
passengers. They were not trained on that aspect. They were not trained on the 
aspect of facilitation … [or] airport security. 
Downsizing the organisation from top to bottom was another important aspect of the 
change process. At the top level, approximately 87 general managers (third level from the 
top) worked within the CAA, and the change team suggested cutting this number to 52. 
Similarly, there were 18 director-level positions (second level after DG), which were cut 
to 12 in the change team’s proposed plan. The change plan also involved the appointment 
of ‘the right person for the right job’, which, in turn, meant reduced influence of the MoD 
regarding appointments within the CAA. 
As part of efforts to ‘convince’ middle and senior managers of the CAA about the 
relevance of the suggested changes in ‘modern times’, a three-day re-structuring exercise 
was arranged by the change team and the new DG. Professors from a top local 
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management school were hired for this purpose. In his inaugural address, the new DG 
said: 
The CAA is to be steered towards a new direction so that it can function in 
harmony with the modern day aviation sector and, therefore, have a working 
setup accordingly… The change in the CAA is part of a constant process to meet 
the requirements of the modern aviation era so as to get better results… We 
want that everyone in the organization should own CAA and perform his 
responsibilities as such… success is awaiting us, but for this, everyone will have 
to work hard to switch over to meet modern-day requirements (Associated Press 
of Pakistan, 2006). 
In order to start the ‘switch over’ process, the consultants used texts (e.g. Harvard 
Business Review readings) and talks on modern-day management to convince the 
audience about ‘modern’ ways of managing organisations. Existing management controls 
instituted by the military were thus implicitly presented as outdated and obsolete. 
6.1.2 The Military’s Response: ‘Counter-Attack’ 
The military began with a full-blown counter-attack on the managers, questioning their 
credentials for managing the aviation authority. This was manifested in the very 
restructuring workshop being conducted by the managers to mount an ideological attack 
on ‘military ways of management’. The Secretary of Defence, who was the chief guest on 
the concluding day of the workshop, began his address by saying that the CAA was not a 
private sector organisation in which a few managers could sit together and change its 
direction. He also emphasised that no one was at liberty to change the basic vision 
enshrined in the ordinance (CAA Ordinance, 1984). This was the start of a series of 
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retaliatory counter-attacks by the military on the managers, which included a memo 
written by the MoD to the Prime Minister’s secretariat, questioning the credentials of the 
newly appointed DG: 
Being highly technical and complex … Civil Aviation Authority top management 
should have adequate experience, knowledge and expertise to lead these 
organisations … [The new DG of CAA] might have had vast experience in 
running the business organisation(s) but he does not possess any experience to 
run a technical and complex organisation… (The News, 2007). 
The MoD had serious concerns about the ‘intentions’ of the new managerial regime. 
According to an interviewee from the MoD: 
Everyone has an angle to ‘change’. [The new DG] wanted more power … there 
was no need for any restructuring as such, as the rules and structures were good 
enough. The best way to do it was to implement the rules and regulations and to 
bring good governance to the organization. 
Immediately afterwards, a memo was written by the MoD to the new DG expressing 
similar sentiments. The military invoked the notion of national interest to resist such 
efforts. According to an official representing the military: 
[The new DG] wanted to have the right to decide on his own as to which airline 
should be allowed to fly into the country without the consultation of the MoD. 
Now this could have harmed the PIA and was unacceptable to the government … 
It would be unacceptable to any government ... Even a person like Shaukat Aziz 
would not allow such things. 
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The new DG felt that the change programme might be crushed in its infancy, so he 
approached the Prime Minister to intervene and salvage the programme. The Prime 
Minister came to his rescue, instructing the relevant state institutions to reconsider the 
change programme.14  
6.1.3 Conflicted Compromises: A Fragile Alliance 
The reconsideration involved removing some issues from the change agenda including, 
most importantly, continuation of the existing arrangement, whereby the MoD would 
control aviation licensing and have a right to appoint personnel in the CAA. In return, the 
MoD and other state institutions allowed the CAA to continue with the change 
programme. This was difficult for managers to accept, but they had no alternative. In an 
interview, one manager commented: 
You see, there are certain power bases within the CAA. These power bases 
consider it their right to appoint people in the CAA. Now there were two 
approaches that we could have taken. We could either have gone for a 
confrontational approach saying that things will only work [our] way … We 
took the latter approach. 
This unstable compromise between the dominant groups at the organisational level re-
shaped the changes originally proposed by the change team. To a certain extent, a similar 
compromise was made at the national level. This was unlike the Fordist compromise 
(Gramsci, 1971), in which state policies on wage increases, full employment and other 
welfare policies were a way of ‘appeasing’ the working class to ensure their consent and 
the continued dominance of capitalist and allied groups (e.g. labour aristocracy). In this 
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case, policies of state, such as the tasks and targets of each of the ministries, business 
plans and the appointment of business managers as heads of public sector corporations, 
were part of the process of the formation of this new ‘power bloc’. 
Under this new arrangement, appeasing the working class was not a concern. Rather, low 
pay-grade public employees were identified as ‘inefficient’ because they did not fear 
heavy disciplinary actions. In order to address this problem, the Removal from Service 
Ordinance 2001 was promulgated by the state, making it easier for seniors to remove 
inefficient public servants. This new arrangement cascaded down to the case 
organisation, in which the military had formerly been the only dominant group. 
6.2 Changes to Management Accounting and Control 
As part of the new arrangement, the military and managers were to form a new power 
bloc, with serious implications for the new MAC regime. Table 3 summarises the MAC 
changes within the CAA as a result of the conflicted and unstable compromise. 
[Insert Table 3] 
6.2.1 Taller, Broader and More Top-Heavy Organisation 
In order to take forward the intended change programme (lean organisational structure; 
independent CAA; and market-oriented, modern budgetary and performance 
measurement system), it needed to be ‘owned’ by senior officers working within the 
CAA. It was felt by the new managerial team that ‘alliances’ were also necessary at the 
organisational level. The intended lean organisational structure was the first obstacle that 
needed to be negotiated. When the change team presented their estimation of the required 
number of senior management positions to senior officers of the CAA, the latter were 
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‘outraged’. The directors contended that going below the approved strength of the 
organisation would be like chopping off their own hands. Thus, the DG had to ask the 
change team to work with HR to come up with a ‘compromise’ solution. 
The result of the compromise was that the total of 87 general manager positions, which 
the change team originally proposed should be cut to 52, was raised to 129. Likewise, the 
18 original director-level positions, to be cut to 12 under the change team’s proposals, 
were revised upwards to 23. While this situation was against the ethos of the ‘lean 
organisation’ so valued by the change team and the new DG, they had to ‘bite this bullet’ 
to win the approval of senior managers in the CAA. The new DG also took this 
opportunity, with the support of the Prime Minister’s office, to appoint managers from 
the private sector to key positions, such as heads of the human resources and finance 
departments, at salaries that were much higher than existing CAA salary scales. It was 
argued that these were key positions that were important for the commercial reorientation 
of the CAA and that the skills required for these positions were not available at the salary 
scales offered by the CAA. The new DG, the change team and the newly-appointed 
managers thus became a pro-change alliance that could potentially neutralise future 
resistance from senior managers. 
Once the change programme had been approved by the CAA’s senior managers, it then 
had to be approved by the MoD. As part of the compromise with the MoD, another layer 
was created within the organisational hierarchy, above the position of directors and below 
the DG position, to accommodate personnel coming from the MoD. A total of six such 
positions was created, entitled ‘additional DGs’. As previously, the MoD was also 
allowed to continue to send defence personnel to the CAA. As a result of this 
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‘compromise’, the organisational structure became even taller and more top-heavy. In 
return, the new managerial regime was allowed to make certain changes that it deemed 
appropriate, the most notable being a split between the air traffic control and airport 
management functions and the introduction of new performance measures and cost 
management initiatives. 
While the change programme was marred by conflict, compromise and concessions with 
regard to the powerful groups, it was a different story for the weaker groups, such as 
employees in slow career directorates, lower pay-grade employees and daily wagers. 
Some of these weaker groups were excited, anticipating that the change would end the 
domination of the PAF, the MoD and the directorate of ATC. However, this did not 
happen. Rather, a round of promotions and appointments took place once the new 
structure had been approved, but many new positions went either to people from the 
MoD and the PAF, or to newly-inducted managers and managers considered close to the 
new regime. In the words of one middle manager: 
We had high hopes from the change, but these did not materialise … Earlier it 
was air traffic control and the Air Force, now it is them and the DG’s favourites 
… Before reorganisation, we were unhappy; now (after reorganisation), we are 
most depressed… 
However, given the path of change so far, the sentiments of the weaker groups were of 
little concern to the pro-change managerial group. Some of the changes they had wanted 
to bring about had been conceded in the process, and they wanted to move quickly on 
others. 
34 
6.2.3 Performance Measurement and Cost Management 
Changes to performance systems were high on the new managerial regime’s agenda. The 
new managerial regime considered the old accounting system and performance 
measurement system based on annual confidential reports (ACRs) to be outdated and 
ineffective. A new performance measurement system was introduced soon after the new 
organisational arrangements had been finalised. The board and senior managers had 
already given their approval for the new system, although they knew little about it. One 
senior manager revealed: 
To be honest, we couldn’t even understand what they were suggesting. Some of 
us did suggest … that it would be a better idea to introduce it on one site before 
rolling it out to the entire organisation. 
There were two major elements in the new system: the tasks and targets to be agreed 
between seniors and subordinates, and the directorate-wide relative ranking of 
employees. The ranking exercise had to demonstrate at least 20 per cent of the employees 
of each unit as ‘below average’ and ‘inadequate performers’. The ranking exercise was to 
begin at the departmental supervisor level. This would then be passed on to their senior 
officers, who would make a new curve incorporating all of their juniors. Eventually, the 
directors were responsible for making a curve for their entire directorate. 
Overall corporate goals were set by the new DG during the first half of the calendar year 
2007, and the directors were required to set targets for their respective subordinates. 
Officers and staff of the CAA resisted the implementation of the new system, arguing 
that it was difficult for them to distinguish between ‘tasks’ and ‘targets’, given the routine 
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and repetitive nature of their job. They also argued, for the same reason, that it was 
difficult for them to assign their employees to different categories of the forced curve. 
However, none of this was taken into consideration by the senior management. 
Successive letters were sent from CAA headquarters to functional heads and airport 
managers warning them of disciplinary action if the system was not implemented. Later, 
to force employees to fill out the performance evaluation forms, it was decided that the 
annual bonus would not be given to employees who failed to submit their forms, and that 
annual bonuses would be given to employees according to their placement on the curve. 
Employees who fell into the ‘below average’ and ‘inadequate’ categories would receive 
no bonus, whereas excellent performers could receive a bonus equivalent to three 
months’ salary. 
Fear of disciplinary action and of losing out on the bonus forced employees reluctantly to 
submit their performance evaluation forms. Lower down the organisational hierarchy, 
dozens of employees worked for a single senior, so it was impossible for the seniors to 
evaluate the performance of their subordinates on a one-to-one basis. Hence, employees 
were asked to sign blank forms and hand them over to their seniors! Senior officers in 
airports allegedly prepared the curves in a very arbitrary manner. According to officers 
working in the field, the result was that, in general, lower pay-grade employees were 
rated as ‘below average’ or ‘inadequate performers’. The situation worsened for lower 
pay-grade employees as successive forced curves were made at higher levels in the 
organisational hierarchy. The senior managers creating the curves inevitably placed their 
immediate juniors at the right end of the curve, thus pushing more and more junior-level 
employees to the ‘wrong end’. The result was that, in a directorate-wide forced curve, 
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senior-level employees were placed in the top categories, whereas lower-level employees 
were placed largely in the ‘average’, ‘below average’ and ‘inadequate performers’ 
categories. 
This whole exercise was generally seen by employees of the CAA as rushed and unfair, 
which did not serve the stated purpose of transparent and objective performance 
measurement. However, this apparently unjust outcome was not perceived in the same 
way by the new managerial regime. The view of the top management was that it was 
simply a matter of people being unhappy with change and trying to stir up unrest. Senior 
managers felt there was nothing inherently wrong with the fact that senior officials had 
been rated higher in the new performance measurement system: “They are good, which is 
why they are seniors”, claimed a senior HR manager. In any case, it was felt that some 
collateral damage was bound to occur whenever a new system was launched. A pro-
change manager revealed: “We introduced a new system in the CAA, and in the 
transition, if some people got hurt, so be it.” 
In addition to the new performance measurement system, the new managerial regime 
extended its efforts to control costs in a bid to change the outdated accounting control 
system at the CAA. The team sought a more ‘proactive’ approach to cost management. 
They took the view that the starting point for cost-cutting should be labour costs. The 
team argued that there were far too many employees in the organisation and that the 
excess labour force was dragging down its profitability. An interview with a pro-change 
senior manager revealed: 
With so much surplus labour, you cannot earn profit … You need to bring it 
[labour cost] down … Yes, it [the CAA] is profitable, but it could become much 
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more profitable … For an organisation to become dynamic and vibrant, its 
financial muscle should be strong … With a small workforce, you can pay them 
well as well, which keeps their morale high. 
In line with this belief, the new DG instructed all functional heads and airport managers 
to reduce the daily wagers’ head count by 15 per cent, a figure which, it seems, was not 
derived from any study; many managers argued that this percentage was merely a 
‘hunch’ of the new DG and of like-minded pro-change managers, rather than the outcome 
of any serious deliberations or calculations. In our interviews, one senior manager gave 
the following rationale: 
In one of my earlier meetings with officers, I asked them about the level of 
efficiency of our labour. They responded by saying that full-time workers work 
at a 70% efficiency level and daily wagers work at 85%. So I deduced that 
perhaps there are 15% excess daily wagers. 
In any case, the reduction in the number of daily wagers was fairly easy to achieve. 
Although they were generally believed to be more efficient than permanent employees, 
they did not have the legal rights enjoyed by their permanent colleagues. Removing them 
from service was considered much easier and less problematic than removing permanent 
employees. However, this effort was never seen in the organisation as an effort to 
‘manage costs’. The cost-saving agenda through shedding lower-level employees was 
overshadowed by parallel promotions and fresh appointments at the top of the 
organisational hierarchy. Employees openly stated at operational sites, and anonymously 
to the media, that the actions of the new regime did not support their stated objective of 
economic efficiency. They asked why, if the organisation was to be run on a profitability 
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logic and there were too many personnel within CAA, were so many new senior manager 
positions being created? How could cutting lower-level employees’ jobs be justified 
when new senior manager positions were being created? Decisions made by the new 
regime (e.g. buying new cars for directors and paying lucrative salaries to newly hired 
professionals) provided further ammunition to employees who were critical of change. 
CAA employees rejected the change programme as an economic efficiency drive. Once 
the economic efficiency criterion was rejected, the redundancy efforts were projected as 
efforts to inflict pain on the working class. The outcome of the performance evaluation 
was quoted as evidence of this ‘attitude’. 
However, the weak bargaining power of the weaker groups (which had no union and no 
state social security) made it easier for the new regime to enforce some of the changes. 
While sensing that some lower-level employees were raising their ‘voice’ at the airports 
against the proposed changes, a memo was written from headquarters stating: 
As in any process of change management, there would always be some concerns 
and fears. There was the fear that people would lose jobs. I have always assured 
you that this would not happen as part of the restructuring process but the loss 
of jobs could take place because of lack of work, poor performance, indiscipline 
or misconduct. 
The strategy of the new managerial system was to make the lower-level employees and 
daily wagers fearful, since gaining their approval for this regime was no longer an option 
(Machiavelli, 1988). The senior management repeatedly addressed official memos and 
internal letters to employees of the CAA, instructing them to embrace the change 
programme or face disciplinary action. One such memo threatened: 
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I am concerned about the slow progress [of filing new performance evaluation 
reports] … I expect you as a senior and responsible individual to take personal 
ownership and ensure completion of 100% of the performance evaluation 
reports concerning your directorate without any further delay. 
Another memo revealed: 
There are, however, some individuals who have negative views on the entire re-
structuring process. I am always open to their views and suggestions but have 
always emphasized that the organization comes first and individual interests 
come later and cannot supersede organizational priorities … I have so far given 
latitude to such individuals, but a time comes when the interests of the 
organization need to be protected and there will be no compromise on this 
aspect. 
It was impossible to win the consent of the weaker groups for the change programme 
owing to the weakening of the ideological power of both the military and the managers. 
In the absence of any apparent dominant ideology, the change appeared more arbitrary 
and coercive to the weaker groups. The compromises made earlier in the programme also 
created a sense of frustration in the pro-change group. Any suggestion to reflect further 
on the proposed changes was seen by the new managerial regime as a ‘delaying tactic’. 
As the initial appointment of the new DG was for two years, there was a sense of urgency 
to show some change to their credit. 
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7. Discussion 
This paper has set out to understand management accounting changes in the context of 
the relationships and strategies of the dominant social groups vis-à-vis each other whilst 
they tried to hegemonise the political and/or organisational landscape. In line with the 
critical realist theory of hegemony (Joseph, 2002), we have sought to explain the agential 
and structural reasons for the emergence of the military and managers as dominant social 
groups at the national and case organisation levels and its linkages with MAC within the 
CAA. Joseph (2002) suggests that functional reasons for the emergence of hegemony are 
linked with the reproduction of social, including economic, structures. This reproduction 
of economic structures will require the state to facilitate the formation of a hegemonic 
bloc (Levy and Scully, 2007). In our case, an economic crisis led the military (which had 
hitherto monopolised the state) to form a power bloc with the managers. Joseph’s theory 
of hegemony emphasises the role of the state in reproducing economic structures, thus 
playing a crucial role in mobilising hegemony. 
While the necessity to reproduce economic structures did play a role in the creation of a 
hegemonic bloc, it was the agential projects of the two social groups to assert their 
dominance that actualised the (weak) form of hegemony that eventually emerged. 
Economic managers, once they were occupying key positions within the state, brought 
with them their own ideology – economic efficiency. The agential aspect of hegemony is 
the domain of politics (Levy and Scully, 2007). In our case, this process entailed firstly a 
‘frontal attack’ by managers to assert their ‘ideal’ controls over the CAA. The managers 
‘presented’ their proposed controls as modern and economically efficient; and military 
controls, such as operational controls and efficiency, as old and outdated. This frontal 
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attack was met with a ‘counter-attack’ by the military, reasserting the ideology of 
‘national security’ and safety and challenging the credentials of the managers to run the 
case organisation. The situation eventually reached a crisis point, whereupon the military 
threatened to pull the plug on the change programme introduced by the managers. A 
somewhat unstable and ‘conflicting compromise’ emerged, which had implications for the 
final shape of MAC within the CAA. 
As part of a restructuring compromise between the two dominant social groups, new 
employees were inducted from the military as well as from business, resulting in the 
organisation becoming even taller and broader. The critical element of the intended 
change was aviation being treated as a business and the prevention of military influence 
over the affairs of the CAA. However, neither of these occurred. As far as the military 
was concerned, the cardinal principle was that all matters of ‘strategic’ significance had 
to be made in line with security considerations. The economy was important but it came 
second, with the greatest priority being defence. Prioritising the economy over defence 
would have deprived the military of the ideological basis on which it had hegemonised 
the country and the case organisation for so long. To a certain extent, as explained in 
Section 6.1, the arrangement at the level of national government was similar. Prime 
Minister Shaukat Aziz had to work as a junior partner with the military generals led by 
General Musharraf. 
Nevertheless, the military had to concede to other changes that the managers were keen 
to implement, such as the new performance measurement system and cost-saving 
strategies in the form of redundancy programmes for workers. This was in line with the 
ideals of managers to bring in economic efficiency. At the same time, it did not affect the 
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interests of the other dominant social group, the military. The fragile alliance formed 
between the two dominant social groups was clearly shaped by their respective interests 
and the political strategies of the two groups vis-à-vis each other. However, material 
concessions to both groups resulted in an incoherent MAC framework lacking any 
ideological consistency or appeal. For example, it was difficult to explain cost 
management efforts to reduce the labour count when additional layers and positions were 
being created at the top. These contradictions arising from conflicted compromise made 
the use of coercive strategies an inevitable choice for the dominant groups to implement 
these changes. As far as the exercise of hegemony is concerned, the use of force is not 
problematic in its own right. However, in order for dominant groups to exercise 
hegemony over dominated groups, the use of force must be legitimised through appeal to 
certain generally agreed principles or ideologies (Gramsci, 1971, p.80). In the case of the 
CAA, the resulting changes in MAC, introduced through the use of force, thus appeared 
arbitrary, purposeless and fragile. The use of force without reference to a coherent 
principle or ideology also indicates a ‘weak’ hegemonic arrangement (Gramsci, 1971, 
p.80), as was the case in the CAA. Weak hegemonic arrangements give ample 
opportunity to dominated groups to mount a ‘war of positions’, exposing apparent 
contradictions in the ideology of dominant groups. While outside the scope of this paper, 
it should be noted that the dominated groups, such as daily wagers, did later exploit these 
contradictions to mount a challenge to the imposed management control changes. 
Temporary stability of controls soon disappeared. 
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8. Conclusions 
The paper has provided an account of why and how a ‘new regime’ of MAC emerged in 
an SOE in the context of changing politico-economic dynamics in Pakistan. 
Appropriating the critical realist theory of hegemony, the paper has deepened 
understanding of the role of dominant social groups and their interrelationships in 
shaping and transforming MAC. Several contributions of the paper can be articulated. 
First, accounting research employing the notion of hegemony generally explains MAC 
changes by exploring the classic contradictory relationship between dominant and 
dominated social groups, and their vested interests and strategies (Cooper and Ezzamel, 
2006; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). In this context, hegemony is then the 
political strategy through which the dominant social groups ‘sell’ changes to the 
dominated groups (Brown and Coupland, 2006; Degiuli and Christopher, 2007). While 
the vertical operation of hegemony is extremely important, this paper brings to light the 
horizontal dimension of hegemony, i.e. the relationship between dominant social groups 
as they form a ‘power bloc’ and its significance for MAC changes. It was clearly evident 
that the nature of the MAC changes was influenced by the political strategies of the two 
dominant groups vis-à-vis each other as they tried to carve out a wider sphere of 
influence for themselves within the power bloc. Assertion of their respective ideologies, 
i.e. ‘national security’ or ‘economic efficiency’, served the same purpose. 
Second, the paper also contributes by deepening our understanding of the manner in 
which MAC changes are implemented and the conditions that may lead to the possibility 
of resistance. The political strategies of the two dominant social groups eventually led to 
a ‘conflicted compromise’, whereby some MAC changes could take place while others 
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could not. However, the nature of the compromise was marred by ideological 
contradictions that accompanied the management control changes. It is here that the 
horizontal dimension of hegemony acquires significance for the vertical dimensions of 
hegemony and for the manner in which MAC changes will be implemented, their 
resistance, and their durability. 
The nature of compromise between the dominant groups within the power bloc is more 
likely to dictate whether MAC changes will be implemented through consent or coercion. 
In our case, the ideological contradiction that emerged in the process of compromise was 
so apparent that management control changes could not be implemented among the 
dominated groups by consent. The generation of consent may require some concessions 
to the dominated groups but, more importantly, it requires an ideological appeal to 
accompany management control changes (Gramsci, 1971). The politics of the dominant 
groups in the process of creating the power bloc may preclude this possibility. This, in 
turn, explains the possibility of resistance by dominated social groups in some cases 
while not in others. While the availability of critical resources and the organisation of the 
dominated social groups will play an important role in determining the nature of 
resistance (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2009), the likelihood or otherwise of 
resistance is perhaps, to some extent, influenced by the nature and process of compromise 
between the dominated social groups. 
Third, the use of Joseph’s (2002) theory of hegemony also helps improve our 
understanding of the role of the state in bringing about MAC changes. As discussed in 
Section 2, the majority of new public management literature on MAC change assumes the 
state to be a homogenous entity which is trying, or is perhaps forced, to reproduce 
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economic structures. In the changing global politico-economic context, the state appears 
to embrace MAC changes that are in line with new public management ideals of 
economic efficiency (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; Broadbent et al., 2001). Drawing on 
the political and organisational literature, we argue that the state is not a homogenous 
entity with a functional role to reproduce economic and social structures within the 
territory that comes under its sphere of control. Instead, the state is a site of hegemonic 
struggles between different groups that are vying for greater control within the power 
bloc. Our case suggests that the need to reproduce economic structures forced the 
military-dominated state to facilitate the creation of a power bloc with the ‘managers’. In 
our case, it was these hegemonic struggles between the military and the managers that 
were primarily responsible for shaping the changes in MACs. Thus, we argue that the 
changes in MACs in the CAA were not simply a reflection of the economic interests of 
the state. Instead, the proposed changes were perhaps a reflection of the vested interests 
of the dominant social groups within the state, who were locked in a hegemonic struggle 
that resulted in an unstable MAC framework, with severe consequences for the weaker 
groups. Based on our analysis, we argue that it would be useful not only to trace the 
economic compulsions of the state but also to include the vested interests of powerful 
social groups engaged in hegemonic struggles within the state for better understanding of 
NPM-driven changes in an SOE. 
Finally, this paper calls for further research in a number of areas. First, the case study 
used in this paper is located in a politically unstable setting. It would be useful to explore 
further the horizontal dimension of hegemony and its significance for MAC changes and 
stability in politically stable countries. Second, one of the dominant social groups in our 
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case is the military. Unstable democracies, dictatorship and weak political institutions 
often give rise to powerful groups such as the military (Hopper et al., 2009; Uddin et al., 
2011). Despite a strong military presence in many countries, the role of the military in 
shaping management accounting practices has been under-studied and -theorised (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008). Further research may shed light on the role of the military in 
shaping management accounting practices, especially in politically unstable countries. 
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1 This paper adopts Hopper et al.’s (2009) broader definition of management accounting controls (MAC). 
The individual ‘elements’ of the control apparatus include changes in vision, organizational structure, 
performance measurement systems and cost management techniques. 
2A social group means a set of agents sharing the same life-chances and interests (Archer, 1995). In 
Gramscian language, powerful or hegemonic groups are those that move beyond the defence of their 
immediate economic interests and aspire to dominate the social and political landscape (Gramsci, 1971; p 
XIV). This is contrasted with less powerful or dominated social groups, also referred to as the subalterns or 
subordinates (ibid). In this paper, the terms dominant and powerful are used interchangeably. 
3This relationship includes the nature of interests of different groups and the extent to which these collide 
with each other. Another important factor is the differential between material and cultural powers of 
powerful and less powerful players. Less powerful players generally have less access to organizational 
resources but may still draw on material or cultural powers as a result of other factors such as unions, 
ethnic ties with power actors outside the organization, etc. (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). 
4 The rise of economic technocrats (private sector managers), especially in SOE, is not a new phenomenon. 
This is closely linked with changing structures of global politics and economy and the promotion of new 
public management worldwide. 
5 The development of a power bloc involves fostering alliances between factions and classes with various 
interests.  
6There are several very insightful papers on the notion of hegemony (Lehman and Tinker, 1987; 
Richardson, 1989; Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 2002). However, these are not directly related to the link 
between the notion of hegemony and MAC change. 
7 Forty-four interviews with 37 top and middle managers (including retired personnel, Ministry of Defence 
officials and consultants) were conducted in three rounds over a span of six months. 
8 For this purpose, we used LexisNexis which, apart from covering international news and media reports, 
also covers five newspapers from Pakistan. We also reviewed five additional major national daily 
newspapers in Pakistan which are not part of LexisNexis. 
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9 The seven members included the Secretary of the
 
MoD (Chairman of the Board), Vice Chief of Air Staff, 
Additional Secretary for Military Finance (Ministry of Finance), Secretary for Planning Division, Secretary 
for Culture and Youth Affairs, Managing Director Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), and DG Civil 
Aviation Authority. 
10 According to news reports, Mr Aziz left Pakistan in 1975 when he was appointed on his first out-of-
country job by Citibank. 
11 Military influence in the political affairs of Pakistan was evident in the fact that the parliament made an 
amendment to the constitution such that General Musharraf could simultaneously hold the positions of 
President and Chief of Army Staff. 
12 Euromoney and The Banker declared him Finance Minister in 2001. 
13 When Shaukat Aziz was appointed, a news report stated: “Aziz’s role, apart from overseeing the 
economy, will be to focus on ensuring better governance, the day-to-day running of the federal 
bureaucracy, and more effective policy execution” (Asian Tribune, 2004). 
14 The following news report summarises what happened: “For the last few weeks, the issue of [change] 
kept on engaging all the key players, resulting in convergence of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Defence and even the Minister of State for Defence at a jointly shared juncture against the increasingly 
isolated CAA DG … The CAA DG approached Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, … urging him to intervene 
in the matter, since all those who matter at the decision making level had one after another distanced 
themselves from the DG on this specific issue…” (The News, 18 January 2007). 
